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Abstract
Poor-blaming and poor-shaming have become intrinsic parts of the neoliberal order. For neoliberal 
discourse to enter and to dominate wider public ‘common sense’, vehicles of ‘populist language’ 
are required and the mass media has taken a central place in propagandising neoliberalism through 
their narration of poverty. This article focuses on so-called ‘reality TV’ and its neoliberal framing of 
the poor, particularly since 2007 and specifically in its generation of support for, and acquiescence 
in, ‘austerity’. We argue that what these programmes provide is a representation of poverty which 
is politically expedient but socially divisive. As criminologists, we suggest that this representation 
symbolises the intensification of what Cohen (2002: xxi) noted as the prominence of ‘“welfare 
cheats”, “social security frauds” and “dole scroungers” as fairly traditional folk devils. Further, we 
argue that an intensification in the denigration of the poor and the marginal in these programmes 
can be traced across three phases, from 2009 onwards, defined by their key features. Whilst not 
neatly discrete, these phases mirror the neoliberal political shift from welfare to punishment. They 
manufacture ‘epidemic problems’ that are seen to require urgent remediation. Yet the status and 
nature of these problems are defined through deception and the forms of intervention required 
are determined through individualised and moralised neoliberal prescription.
Keywords
Austerity, benefits, neoliberal, poverty, reality TV
Corresponding author:
Alana Barton, Department of Law and Criminology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, Lancashire, L39 4QP, UK. 
Email: bartona@edgehill.ac.uk
679475 CMC0010.1177/1741659016679475Crime, Media, CultureBarton and Davis
research-article2016
Article
 by guest on November 25, 2016cmc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
2 CRIME MEDIA CULTURE 
Introduction
For CW Mills (2000 [1959]), private troubles can only be understood in relation to public, struc-
tural issues. When one person is unemployed or in poverty or experiencing some other form of 
social exclusion or marginalisation, it is a private trouble but when millions experience such condi-
tions it only makes sense as a structural, public issue. It cannot be explained as the product of 
individual deficits and misfortunes. In the absence of a Millsian sociological imagination, however, 
the opposite can become the case. In the post-financial crisis, its structural causes, and those of 
the economic, political and social crises that followed, have been almost magically erased. In their 
place an individualised, moralistic behavioural explanation has been distilled – that of ‘broken 
Britain’ (Slater, 2014).
Seeing poverty as a product of individual, familial and communal inadequacies is inherent to a 
neoliberal order that proclaims itself as meritocratic. Poor-blaming and poor-shaming have 
become intrinsic parts of that order. The mass media has taken a central place in propagandising 
neoliberalism through their narration of poverty. Over the last three decades, it has intensified a 
populist and increasingly authoritarian agenda that both derives and distracts from political disaf-
fection and discontent. This article focuses on so-called ‘reality TV’ and its neoliberal framing of 
the poor, particularly since 2007, and, specifically, its generation of support for, and acquiescence 
in, ‘austerity’. As we have argued elsewhere (Barton and Davis, 2013), the extent of the ‘war’, 
waged by political elites and bolstered by compliant media, against society’s poorest is difficult to 
overstate and its subsequent social, psychological and economic harms demand urgent debate 
within criminology.
Neoliberal ideology, poor-hate and ‘reality TV’
Antipathy towards the poor in the UK is rooted in long established political and economic pro-
cesses and reproduced in populist ideologies. Since the 1980s, sustained and systematic reregula-
tion in favour of ‘free’ markets has undermined social insurance and the collectivisation of risk. 
Workers’ rights have been undermined and ‘unstable’ forms of employment have been expanded, 
whilst a ‘business-friendly’ state has ‘reformed’ welfare provisions. This has led to increasing 
dependency of workers on employers (Dardot and Laval, 2013), vulnerability to dangerous work-
ing practices (Tombs and Whyte, 2010), the deepening of social insecurities (Wacquant, 2009) 
and the creation of new ‘precarious’ groups (Standing, 2011). To self-manage ‘market driven’ 
insecurities (Bauman, 2011), neoliberal subjects are required to become ‘… entit[ies] in a competi-
tion, who must maximize [their] results by exposing [them]self to risks and taking full responsibility 
for possible failures’ (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 261). Workers must respond to their insecurity by 
being ‘enterprising’, ‘flexible’ and ‘competitive’ (Giroux, 2014). In neoliberal rhetoric, work is 
constructed without irony as ‘the privileged vehicle of self-realisation’ (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 
265) and workers themselves become beings ‘all of whose subjectivity must be involved in the 
activity they are required to perform’ (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 260). Employees are expected to 
work with dedication and enthusiasm, identifying with the ‘missions’ of their employers. They are 
expected to become, in Mills’s terms, ‘cheerful robots’ (2000 [1959]) or, to use Bunting’s (2004) 
description, ‘willing slaves’. As the neoliberal crisis has bitten, however, the ‘hardworking’, ‘tax-
paying’ ‘cheerful robots’ have become considerably less cheery. Previously contented groups have 
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progressively come to experience precarity (Standing, 2011) and have become more open to 
messages of resentment.
Perversely, at the same time that ordinary individuals have become responsibilised for their 
failures in the market place, vast sums of public money have been used to ‘bail out’ the financial 
sector. With extraordinary audacity, measures targeting the unemployed, the disabled, the young 
and the working poor have been constructed as essential to pay for the aftermath of a crisis 
caused by financial and political elites – and even as protection for the next one (Osborne, cited 
in The Guardian, 2016). Despite the coalition government’s claims that ‘we are all in this together’, 
the greatest costs of the crisis have been borne by those who did not contribute to it. Through the 
‘alchemy of austerity’ (Jensen, 2014: para 2.1), the weakest social groups were targeted to pay 
for the massive market failures of casino capitalism. As a consequence, the poor, both employed 
and unemployed, have faced increasingly punitive conditions (Wacquant, 2009). Harsh, target 
driven approaches to benefit entitlements have shifted public focus downwards instead of 
upwards. Benefits were cut for those with a ‘spare’ bedroom. Draconian assessments for disabled 
people pronounced seriously ill claimants fit to work – sometimes with tragic consequences – 
whilst at the same time inheritance tax and the top rate of income tax were reduced and the value 
of assets like bonds, shares and property was boosted through central bank quantitative easing. 
In 2014 Oxfam reported that when all austerity measures were taken into account, including cuts 
to public services and changes to welfare and taxes, between 2010 and 2014 the poorest tenth 
of the population experienced a 38% decrease in their net income. In contrast the richest tenth 
saw only a 5% fall in income. In the same years, the super-rich – the richest 1000 individuals – 
held wealth of £519b, a 55% increase in four years. Had this increase been distributed among all 
UK families, each would have been over £6000 better off (Dorling et al., 2016). In the six years 
from 2009–2015, as austerity was imposed on the poor and the middling, the wealthiest 1000 
doubled their wealth (Dorling et al., 2016).
This has been legitimised through the ideological denigration of the poor, dividing people of 
modest or low incomes against each other and reinforcing fear and mistrust of the economically 
‘marginal’. Politically generated and media disseminated ideological narratives, drawing on meri-
tocratic myth, and blatantly misappropriating the concept of ‘fairness’, gained considerable public 
support. They have produced anxiety that some groups are getting ‘special treatment’ or other 
social privileges from the state (Valentine and Harris, 2014) – a ‘something for nothing’ myth that 
has reduced social relations to ‘social combat’ (Giroux, 2014). As Strong (2014: 117) states, inse-
curity is generated ‘through the political-economic threat to the majority of having to support an 
undeserving population of “market failures”’. Alarmingly, there has been little evidence of any 
surge of empathy for those who have suffered most, or of solidarity between the insecure. Rather, 
the extreme challenges of ‘surviving at the bottom of a savage neoliberal order’ have helped dis-
tract attention from the structures that are really to blame (Giroux, 2014: 2). The notion of who 
‘we’ are amidst the crisis has been transfigured: ‘we’ were the victims of elite greed and incom-
petence; now ‘we’ are righteous ‘hardworking taxpayers’. ‘We’, in Nick Clegg’s telling 2010 
General Election soundbite, are ‘alarm clock Britain’, resentfully pulling back the bedclothes, 
whilst sleeping scroungers sponge ‘on benefits’. As Hall et al. (1978: 156) noted nearly 40 years 
ago, political and media propaganda creates hegemonic ‘common’ sense attitudes which serve to 
disguise significant class differences, and at the same time ‘establish[] a false coincidence of ideas 
between different classes. This coincidence then becomes the basis for the myth of a single, 
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English kind of thought’. Through this ‘single kind of thought’, the poor have become ‘national 
abjects’ (Tyler, 2013: 47) and poor-hate has gained rapid political ascendancy.
Crucially, for neoliberal discourse to enter and dominate wider public ‘common sense’, vehicles 
of ‘populist language’ are required (Jensen, 2014). In this context, the genre of so-called ‘reality 
TV’ serves significant ideological functions. Reality television is not a new phenomenon. Arguably, 
as Friedman (2002) explains, the relationship between television and ‘reality’ can be dated back 
to the origins of television itself in that television represents the only medium that can broadcast 
visual images and sound as they occur in real time. The direct precedents of contemporary pro-
grammes can be traced to the 1940s and 1950s when new forms of live production created for 
the viewer a sense of ‘real, as opposed to fabricated suspense’ (Friedman, 2002: 4). Clissold 
(2004) gives the example of Candid Camera, first shown in the US in 1948, as the programme that 
foreshadowed many contemporary shows. It involved ordinary members of the public filmed via 
concealed cameras whilst being confronted with unusual (but deliberately setup) situations. 
Importantly, in addition to setting a blueprint for programmes using ‘real’ people as the source of 
entertainment, as Clissold (2004) argues, Candid Camera – created in the Cold War context of 
public and political paranoia and fear of surveillance – also represented how the genre could func-
tion as a conduit for broader social, political and/or ideological concerns.
By the late 20th century, reality TV began to reflect and reproduce neoliberal, rather than Cold 
War, concerns and anxieties. The genre became increasingly popular in the aftermath of the 
Writers’ Guild of America strike in 1988 because, in terms of production, programmes did not rely 
on expensive scriptwriters or unionised professional actors (Grazian, 2010). Moreover, just as the 
production values of reality TV embody neoliberal economic principles, so ‘narrative conventions 
reflect its morals [… and …] celebrate [its] radical right-wing values’ (Grazian, 2010: 69). Specific 
behaviours, aspirations and routines are venerated or derided within ideological valorisation of 
individualisation, self-governance and ‘free’ consumerised choice (Ouellette and Hay, 2008). 
Neoliberalism’s ‘system of cruelty’ is legitimised through the reiteration of ritualised performance 
across a range of programme types (Couldry, 2008). The premise of shows is frequently oppres-
sive, exploitative and victimising. Contestants in Hell’s Kitchen, for example, are required to live 
on the premises in which they ‘work’, are only allowed out with a chaperone and are subjected 
to haranguing and abuse. Those on Survivor live in shanty towns and ‘literally starve while the 
world watches yet remain[s] on the couch’ (Grazian, 2010: 69). The ‘gamedoc’ programme Big 
Brother enshrines the values and obligations of the neoliberal workplace: submission to constant 
surveillance and external authority; team conformity; individual responsibility; ‘authentic’ positivity 
and adherence to the goals of an organisation, institution or employer, become ritually performed 
(Couldry, 2008). These ‘theatrical’ representations transform the ‘truths’ of neoliberalism into 
acceptable norms. Ouellette (2004) argues that US show Judge Judy uses the trials of working 
class people to emphasise the values of the archetypal neoliberal citizen; self-enterprising, self-
sufficient and able to function without state intervention. Further, as Kohm (2006) notes, Judge 
Judy is a stark example of the normalisation of neoliberal models of governance and, specifically, 
law and of the ways in which such models are directed towards particular vulnerable or margin-
alised groups.
Judge Sheindlin’s insistence that any problem – no matter how systematic or rampant in society 
– is merely the fault of those who are caught up within it is a very powerful way of advancing 
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a neoliberal agenda of cuts to social programs and the dismantling of the final vestiges of the 
welfare state. (Kohm, 2006: 716)
Neoliberal discourse has of course also underpinned other TV forms over recent years. ‘Tabloid’ 
talk shows of the 1990s (such as the US Oprah Winfrey Show or the UK’s Trisha) which, through 
a focus on ‘self-empowerment’ (usually through personal confession), served to individualise a 
range of social problems.1 Programmes like Dragon’s Den and The Apprentice have venerated the 
values of neoliberal entrepreneurship, endorsing the ruthlessness of ‘business’ and ‘the market’, 
applauding self-interest and, at the same time, ensuring that nearly every player will lose (Kelly 
and Boyle, 2012). ‘Audiences’, as Grazian (2010: 70) notes, ‘expect layoffs at the conclusion of 
every episode’.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, reality TV in the UK took a new (although pre-
dictable) turn. As the material existence of marginal groups came under fierce political attack, a 
new set of ‘reality’ programmes began an unprecedented cultural assault on their behaviours, 
morals and lifestyles. Sometimes referred to as ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) and forming part of 
what Giroux (2008) has called the neoliberal ‘theatre of cruelty’, these programmes, through the 
‘naturaliz[ation] [of] the ideology of broken Britain’ became a central part of the narration of the 
socialisation of what had originally been a financial crisis (Tyler, 2014).
Neoliberalism, indeed, requires ‘outsiders’ or to use Tyler’s (2013) term, ‘national abjects’. 
Scapegoating and ‘othering’ justify the reproduction of its inequalities and injustices. In the reality 
TV programmes considered here, the weakest individuals and groups are reconstructed as eco-
nomic and social threats. Refugees are transformed into ‘benefit seekers’, the unemployed into 
work-shy scroungers and the disabled into malingerers. In all, they are pitilessly constructed as 
feckless, immoral and parasitic. Rather than applauding neoliberalism’s ‘successes’, as, say Big 
Brother or The Apprentice do, these programmes focus on the castigation of its losers. They indi-
vidualise social problems, dislocate private troubles from public issues and ‘seek biographical solu-
tions to systemic contradictions’ (Beck and Beck-Germshein, 2001: xxii). What is provided is a 
representation of ‘poverty’ which is politically expedient but socially divisive. We suggest that an 
intensification in the denigration of the poor and the marginal in these programmes can be traced 
across three overlapping phases, from 2009 onwards, defined by their key features:
•	 Neo-philanthropic ‘empowerment’ of the (‘deserving’) poor
•	 Neoliberal shaming of the unrespectable (but potentially redeemable) poor
•	 Derision of the unrespectable, unredeemable and shameless poor
These phases are not neatly discrete but they mirror the neoliberal political shift from welfare 
to punishment. They epitomise a ‘theatre of cruelty’ that is getting crueller. To be clear, we are 
not giving a systematic analysis of every programme. Rather, we offer some broad thematic reflec-
tions on the shifting nature of this form of reality TV. In particular, we highlight the contribution 
of such programmes to the production of ignorance about complex social processes in general 
and the generation of inequality in particular.
Agnotology, McGoey suggests (2012: 3), should address ‘the political and social practices 
embedded in the effort to suppress or to kindle endless new forms of ambiguity and ignorance’. 
The ignorance and doubt generated – ‘agnosis’ – contribute towards a manufactured consent 
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towards political and cultural hegemonies (in this case neoliberalism), acquiescence in their 
harmful consequences and the diminution or shifting of responsibility for those consequences. 
Some accounts of agnosis emphasise the creation of doubt towards scientific evidence in the 
interests of corporations: waters have been deliberately muddied, for example, around evidence 
of climate change and the dangers of asbestos and tobacco. A range of effective public relations 
strategies have been created in defence of profitable interests in such cases. However, ignorance 
can be contrived through a variety of means, not only the creation of doubt. The production of 
ignorance may include: direct censorship and suppression, misleading ‘information manage-
ment’ – both formal and informal – the dissemination of false ‘knowledge’ and flawed systems 
of analysis and understanding. Whatever the specific intentional strategies and tactics or unin-
tended structural/cultural/psychological forces that may be in play, the common element is the 
promotion of false understanding. Ignorance, read in this broad way, flourishes within and con-
tributes to the reproduction of social and political cultures of indifference, coldness (Adorno, 
1967) and intellectual and empathic ‘de-imagination’ (Barton and Davis, 2015; Giroux, 2014). 
Within such cultures, harmful untruths find ready acceptance, facilitated by public senses of 
political impotence, passivity and apathy (Barton and Davis, 2015). In this specific context, the 
willful and deliberate production of ignorance around poverty and welfare is propagated by 
politicians, ‘pundits’ and right-wing think-tanks (Slater, 2014). Reality TV programmes that scru-
tinise, ‘expose’ and moralise the lives of the poor are also deeply engaged in the process. They 
create the ‘spectacle’ of poverty. They manufacture ‘epidemic problems’ that seem to require 
urgent remediation. Yet the status and nature of these problems are defined through deception 
and the forms of intervention required are determined through individualised and moralised 
neoliberal prescription.
Methods
It was not the purpose of this research to conduct a scientific, quantitative sampling of all ‘reality’ 
television programmes that fell into the genres we outline above. Rather, our intention was to 
undertake a rigorous qualitative analysis of a range of programmes with the aim of drawing out 
discursive themes.
A total of 17 different programmes, consisting of 34 individual episodes, were viewed. Eleven 
of these programmes form the foundation of the analysis,2 whilst the remaining six3 were watched 
and analysed for the purposes of informing broader context. It was not possible to get access to 
every programme that fell into the genre and so programmes for analysis were selected primarily 
on the basis of their availability via personal recordings, Box of Broadcasts (an on-demand televi-
sion for education service), YouTube and other internet sites.
Taking a qualitative approach, our primary aim was not to achieve broad representativeness in 
terms of the programmes selected, however it is notable that the programmes analysed were not 
unrepresentative or exceptional. The programmes were examined with regard to their representa-
tions of poverty and marginalisation, with particular focus on notions of ‘causation’ and blame-
worthiness. Specifically, employing inductive thematic analysis, the aim was to a) explore the 
portrayal of poverty and marginalisation, b) identify implicit and explicit ideas and meanings 
related to poverty and marginalisation and c) uncover themes of continuity and discontinuity 
across the range of programmes over the specified period of time.
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Neo-philanthropic ‘empowerment’ of the (‘deserving’) 
poor: The largesse of the rich and famous in ‘breadline 
Britain’
Audiences are well used to celebrities attempting to ‘make a difference’, raising public awareness 
of (often global) problems. However, 2009 saw the development of this trope in the UK with 
programmes deploying celebrities to not only highlight, but to directly intervene in, problems such 
as unemployment, poverty and crime. Part celebrity vehicle and (allegedly) part social documen-
tary, they accompanied rich and famous people providing ‘deserving’ (contrite) poor people with 
advice (e.g. ITV’s 7 Days on the Breadline, Duchess on the Estate and Home Is Where the Heart Is) 
and/or skills (e.g. Gordon Behind Bars (Channel 4) and Football Behind Bars (Sky 1))4.
The use of specific ‘types’ of celebrities in these programmes – those perceived as ‘ordinary’ 
despite their success and/or celebrities who have themselves experienced hardship or struggle – 
simultaneously synthesised viewer interest and enhanced the dramatic appeal of the shows. For 
example, in the opening scenes of Football Behind Bars (Sky One, 2009) the narrator explained:
Ian Wright is a man on a mission. He passionately believes that football has the power to trans-
form lives: like it did for him. [Cut to scenes of Ian Wright scoring goals]. Now he’s testing his 
faith in football inside the UK’s prison system. [Cut to scenes of prison officers urgently running 
upstairs as if to an emergency, and prisoners talking of killings in prison]. He wants to turn 22 
young criminals into footballers and change their lives forever so after they leave prison they 
will never come back.
Having served 14 days in prison as a younger man, Wright argued that if he was able to turn 
his life around through football others could do likewise. He stated that ‘the sound of the prison 
doors closing and the nutters [sic] inside taught me I can’t live my life like this’ (Wright, 2007). 
ITV’s 7 Days on the Breadline (2009) featured four celebrities (former Spice Girl Melanie Brown, 
makeover ‘guru’ Trinny Woodall, former rugby player Austin Healey and actor Keith Allen) osten-
sibly drawing upon personal experiences to provide ‘expert’ advice during one week with ‘low 
income families’ in Leeds (Guardian, 2009). ‘Society girl’ Trinny Woodall, for example, compared 
her own drug addiction with the slot-machine habit of pensioner, Christine.
Despite the premise of ‘benevolence’, and the no-doubt genuine concern of the celebrities, 
their intervention clearly emanated from the obsessive neoliberal illusion of personal responsibil-
ity. They were poverty tourists and the poor person was the spectacle: a juxtaposition of the 
wealthy luminary and the deprivation into which they were parachuted. As Tanya Gold (2014) 
noted, reviewing these programmes, they represented an ‘AK-47 of fleeting and synthetic empa-
thy [where t]he lesson is simply the familiar narcissism of the ruling class: the most interesting 
thing about poverty is what a blow it is to those who don’t have to live in it’. The show’s producer 
David Flynn remarked: ‘Our celebrities are going to step into the shoes of people on the estate and 
it will be compelling to see how they cope and if they can make a difference’ (Endemol UK, 2010, 
emphasis added). Celebrity participant Keith Allen, commented:
I’m expecting hardship. But I’m also in a way kind of looking forward to trying to get under the 
skin of the people and finding out how they cope with hardship and if they perceive it as 
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hardship. I think foremost I’d like to get the message across ‘don’t let the bastards grind you 
down’. (TV Throng, 2009)
Similarly, Melanie Brown enthused that ‘anything that takes you out of your comfort zone and 
gives you a chance to challenge yourself is always rewarding’ (Brown, 2009).
In Duchess on the Estate (ITV, 2009), Duchess of York Sarah Ferguson made several visits to the 
Northern Moor council estate in Wythenshawe, Manchester. She was inspired to extend her previ-
ous work against obesity to the plight of the ‘underclass’. She explained her experience of the 
problem: ‘Young people go out with their mobile telephones and their knives now. I’ve noticed a 
lot more violence, I’ve noticed bad language. Literally, you can’t get some young people to do 
joined up writing, let alone joined up sentences’ (Express, 2009). Putting to one side the question 
of how, precisely, the Duchess had come to ‘notice’ these things, her dysphoric vision of the 
nation (casually collapsing issues without any discernible evidence of a social science education) 
was contrasted with deeply nostalgic historical references to a past golden age of solid respecta-
ble families and ‘tight-knit’ communities. Accordingly, the Duchess looked beyond everyday prob-
lems. She wanted to instill good old fashioned ‘community values’. Her plan was in equal measures 
simple, self-regarding and facile:
I inspire people to get on and do things by rallying the troops. I’m an enabler. What saved 
people after the blitz was a cup of tea and a biscuit … I mean, going back to the Queen 
Mother, you know it was after World War II that Britain was so famous for ‘a cup of tea and a 
biscuit’ … We listened and we talked to each other so much more … (ITV, 2009)5
In another interview with GMTV (14 August 2009), the Duchess of York again talked about this 
‘community spirit’:
I’ve always wanted to bring community spirit back to Britain … I think it’s time for more of 
talking to each other and listening to each other and the mothers and the women and the 
people of Northern Moor … they wanted to get some pride back in their area. So I went up 
there, spent some time up there, talking to them … and say ‘ok, what do you want to do’ and 
they said ‘we want to, you know, put flower pots back, we want to get everybody talking … 
so there is hope …
Her solution for the estate, beset she claimed by unemployment, crime and drugs, was for the 
residents, led by local mum Dawn, to raise money for a £40,000 community centre.
Celebrities in these programmes often represented the viewer. And whilst they communicated 
sympathetically with real people suffering real problems, it is the people, not the problems that 
were subjected to questioning. The subject was presented both as a unique individual (with whom 
the celebrity could establish an inter-personal relationship) and as a generalised subject (repre-
senting a broader body of people that the viewer could enjoy not relating to). Narratives reconfig-
ured personal accounts within popularist expectations, norms and agendas. They assuredly:
… d[id] not enable the individual to transcend the narrow milieux in which [they lived], or truly 
connect them with the larger realities of what [wa]s happening in the world. On the contrary 
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they obscured these connections by distracting [their] attention and fastening it upon artificial 
frenzies that [we]re resolved within the programme framework. (Mills, 2008: 114)6
Such ‘frenzies’ are achieved through a form of ‘neo-philanthropism’ (Villadsen, 2008). 
There was a clear missionary purpose in these shows. Wedded to self-help, personal responsi-
bility and the individualisation of social problems, they rested upon the motivation, ‘empower-
ment’ and thus rehabilitation of those outside neoliberal ideals. Structural realities disappeared 
(Vander Schee and Kline, 2013) and the responsibilised poor became dependent on the chari-
table expertise of their selfless celebrity advisors. Difficulties were reconstructed as moral fail-
ures. The aim in such neoliberalised strategies of ‘empowerment’ is to revitalise the ‘positive 
core’ of the recipient (Villadsen, 2008). Subjects must recognise and take control of their 
problems. Self-esteem and self-development become the magic keys to overcoming the myriad 
interrelated and structurally produced challenges of poverty. Thus, the ‘good’ neoliberal citi-
zen – one who is self-governing and self-reliant even in the most adverse circumstances – is 
constructed (Ouellette and Hay, 2008). The glaring contradictions inherent, for example, in 
‘empowering’ men behind bars or people living below the breadline are ignored. ‘Empowerment’ 
becomes a simulated concept and nothing like meaningful liberation or emancipation. What 
we see instead is ‘performed empowerment’. Viewer comments that followed these pro-
grammes praised those participants who demonstrated their acquiescence towards ‘expert’ 
prescription. Those by contrast who openly resented the intrusion of celebrities and camera 
crews into their lives, such as the teenager who told Mel B to ‘fuck off’, became the objects of 
cyber-opprobrium.
In sum, this first raft of programmes offered ‘neoliberalised’ understandings of social welfare. 
Celebrity endorsement of ‘self-help’ supplanted any genuine understanding of the structural gen-
eration of poverty and the necessity of public welfare (Vander Schee and Kline, 2013). At a time 
when political elites were noisily signalling increasingly restricted conceptions of their responsibili-
ties for social security, this form of reality TV offered ‘informal’ guidelines for living, endorsing 
neoliberal notions of governing from a distance (Kelly and Boyle, 2012; Ouelette and Hay, 2008). 
Whilst the poor were not viewed inhumanely, failure to properly perform endeavour or gratitude 
indicated recalcitrance – grounds for moral censure both in programme narration and internet 
commentary.
Neoliberal shaming of the unrespectable (but redeemable) 
poor: ‘Bilking and milking the system’
Around 2009–2010, reflecting the intensification of the political ‘war on public services’ (BBC, 
2010), reality TV programmes turned from celebrity facilitated ‘empowerment’ of the marginal-
ised towards ‘exposure’ and shaming of their ‘dysfunctional’ lifestyles. This second ‘phase’ of 
programmes includes those that are often referred to as ‘poverty porn’.7 This term does not refer 
to the offensiveness or ‘obscenity’ of poverty but rather, as Jensen (2013) explains, to the exploita-
tive motives and practices of programme makers, who set out to produce superficial representa-
tions of the poor that require ‘no interpretative work from the viewer’ but which incite in the 
audience a powerful, judgemental and usually condemnatory response.
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The most obvious distinction between these programmes and those above is the absence of 
the celebrity ‘mediator’ between viewer and subjects.8 A voiceover narrator and interviewer are 
present although the latter is not always seen or heard. Generally, subjects appear to speak 
directly to the audience, with their ‘voices’ unmediated. However, they are clearly edited and 
viewers are given strong narrative and visual steers as to how they should frame what they are 
witnessing. The ‘spectacle’ in these programmes is the poor themselves and the role they play in 
their own failures, and subsequently, stigmatisation.
Take Channel 4’s Benefits Street, for example.9 Although the first episode is relatively sympa-
thetic to its subjects, sections of the programme are clearly designed to provoke the ire of viewers. 
‘Career criminal’ Danny, demonstrating his shoplifting skills and candidly stating that he doesn’t 
want to work because he is a ‘lazy dickhead’, is one example. Young couple Mark and Becky, 
clearly struggling with two young children on £30 per week reduced benefits, admit to having 
previously brought in around £1500 per week through fraudulent claims. Although the stories 
presented in these programmes are exceptional, they are presented as, and thus can be readily 
mistaken for, the norm. But perhaps even more aggravating to a ‘time poor’ precariat audience 
(Standing, 2011), James Turner Street residents sometimes enjoy their ‘time rich’ lives – drinking, 
smoking and congregating on doorsteps or on settees in the street. Patently incongruous with the 
neoliberal model of the (self-) disciplined worker, ‘worklessness’ becomes reconstructed as a dec-
adent indulgence rather than structural privation.
Worklessness as a personal and cultural choice is a key feature of the agnosis around ‘broken 
Britain’. Government strategy to manage the aftermath of the financial crisis has been to con-
struct a perception of a society with large numbers of people unnecessarily dependent on welfare 
benefits (Hancock et al., 2012). For example, in 2006 the so-called Centre for Social Justice identi-
fied five ‘pathways to poverty’. These were: family breakdown; educational failure; addiction; 
serious personal debt; and economic dependency and worklessness (typically conceived as due to 
individual inadequacies and a counter-productive welfare system).
Despite weak and/or manipulated evidence for these claims (MacDonald et al., 2014; Standing, 
2011) the ‘problem’ of worklessness in particular developed political and social currency and 
numerous ‘workfare’ arrangements were introduced.10 A combined ‘incentives and conse-
quences’ approach (DWP, 2012) included: the introduction of a benefit cap (to ensure ‘everyone 
had the same incentive to work’ (DWP, 2012: 39, emphasis added)); the creation of The Work 
Programme (a welfare-to-work pay-by-results strategy introduced in 2011 and outsourced to a 
range of (often private sector) organisations); the Work Choice scheme (‘helping’ unemployed 
disabled people to adapt to the demands of the workplace); and increased sanctions for claimants 
who did not ‘fulfil their responsibilities’ (DWP, 2012: 39, emphasis added). Corroboration for the 
worklessness myth from self-perpetuating political and media rhetoric has propagated new forms 
of ‘commonsense’ about poverty, disability and unemployment (Jensen, 2014).
The BBC’s Trouble on the Estate, for example, filmed on the Shadsworth Estate in Blackburn, 
aimed to uncover what it was like to grow up and live on ‘one of the most deprived [areas] of the 
country’ (BBC, 2012a), highlighting the problems of ‘[d]rugs, anti-social behaviour, family break-
ups and joblessness …’ on an estate which ‘on average, per person, had one of the highest wel-
fare bills in the country’ (BBC, 2012b). Linking explicitly with government discourse, the programme 
presented ‘a picture of “Broken Britain” - a place at the edge of where the state can make a dif-
ference’ (BBC, 2012a).
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Benefit Busters (2009) on Channel 4 further naturalised workless, ‘broken Britain’. The pro-
gramme featured Hayley, a trainer for A4E (Action for Employment, a private company paid by the 
government to find work for the long term unemployed) delivering a ‘positive thinking’ session to 
a group of lone parents wanting to get back into work. She asked them: ‘Why aren’t you all 
queueing up outside MacDonald’s, Burger King and KFC then? … Why aren’t you all queuing up 
outside their door if you all want a job so badly?’ The unseen narrator confirmed the need for 
‘reform’:
The bill for social security benefits keeps on rising. It’s now more than all the income tax paid 
by British taxpayers put together … A fair system that is tough on the work-shy and supportive 
to those who are desperate to work has eluded all political parties … This government’s radical 
idea is to award large contracts to private sector companies and charities and reward them for 
getting claimants back to work … Paying by results has given rise to a new breed of benefit 
buster. (Emphasis added)
Hayley told her jobless lone parents ‘[t]here is not one of you in this room who cannot go out 
and get a job tomorrow and that is a fact’ (Studio Lambert, 2015). The message was that social 
security was unaffordable and benefits regimes were insufficiently tough on the ‘work-shy’. 
However, the biggest proportion of national ‘benefits’ spending was, and still is, on state pensions 
– approximately 47%. At no point did this programme – or any other programme in the genre – 
target pensioners. In 2014, from a bill of £150 billion, less than 0.6% was spent on Job Seekers’ 
Allowance, far less than was spent topping up the incomes of those in low paid jobs. In these 
programmes the familiar myths were peddled that not working is a matter of choice and that 
‘joblessness’ is the result of a lack of will. At the end of the course, A4E managed to find four 
trainees two-week, unpaid placements in Poundland. They were informed that paid employment 
might follow if they proved ‘good enough’. With exquisite irony, A4E (which became People Plus 
in 2015) was itself dogged by financial scandal, falsifying the number of its claimed ‘successes’ 
and defrauding the DWP on this basis. The investigations resulted in prison sentences for a num-
ber of employees (Guardian, 2015).
On this note, in addition to the myth of ‘worklessness’, numerous programmes embellished 
their accounts of poverty with the supposed ‘epidemic’ of benefit fraud. This was crucial: to justify 
cutting benefits claimants needed to be constructed as undeserving. One way to do this was to 
present them as ‘cheats’, people too lazy to work when they could ‘fiddle the system’ instead. In 
2013, the BBC programme Britain on the Fiddle claimed to explore the ‘runaway problem of ben-
efit fraud’ (emphasis added), whilst the series Saints and Scroungers (launched in 2009 and now 
in its seventh series) ‘follow[ed] fraud officers as they bust[ed] the benefit thieves stealing millions 
of pounds every year’.11 As official figures show, however, money defrauded from welfare 
expenditure is only a fraction of that lost through tax avoidance and evasion. Figures from the 
Department of Works and Pensions, the Insurance Fraud Bureau and HMRC indicate that the cost 
of benefit fraud amounts to around £1.1 billion (Guardian, 2014). Yet £2.1 billion in benefits 
remain unpaid due to error. Meanwhile, the estimated difference between the tax that should be 
collected if the system operated effectively and the amount actually collected has been estimated 
at £35 billion by HMRC itself (Guardian, 2013). Tax Research UK estimate the figure to be £119 
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billion. Either way, the problem of benefit fraud pales into insignificance alongside money ‘lost’ to 
tax avoiders and evaders.12
Putting financial agnosis to one side, perhaps the most pernicious aspect of these programmes 
has been the demarcation they have established between the ‘respectable’ poor and the ‘unre-
spectable’ poor. They have consolidated ‘shared norms’ around the powerful binary of ‘skiver’ 
and ‘striver’, or ‘worker’ and ‘shirker’, which ‘conceives of … citizens as one or the other, occupy-
ing different spaces, orientated by different morals, aspirations and values’ (Jensen, 2014: para 
2.5). BBC1’s Saints and Scroungers explicitly bolstered two myths – that benefit claimants could 
be categorised one-dimensionally as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and that for every genuine claimant there 
was a sponger fleecing the system. BBC1’s Nick and Margaret: We All Pay Your Benefits also 
epitomised this ideological division.13 The programme brought four benefit claimants and four 
‘taxpayers’ (notwithstanding that benefits recipients pay tax themselves) ‘face-to-face to explore 
each other’s lives … and speak their minds’ (BBC, 2013). Needless to say, the claimants were not 
chosen because they claimed child benefit or the state pension. ‘Workers’ and ‘shirkers’ were 
undisputed categories and presented as if belonging to either group were a matter of choice. For 
presenters Nick and Margaret unemployment was alien. Margaret stated ‘the benefits world is not 
something I know anything about’ (emphasis added) whilst Nick replied ‘me neither … we’re the 
explorers’ (emphasis added). The ‘taxpayers’ made disapproving judgements about the lifestyles 
of the claimants: that they visited a betting shop, owned pets, had tattoos, owned an iPhone and 
even, quite astonishingly in the case of one mother, bought a chicken to provide a hot meal for 
her children when they did not need a hot evening meal as they had eaten a school lunch. The 
ideological message of ‘less eligibility’ could hardly be clearer. Self and social worth are equated 
solely with paid employment. For example, in keeping with government reforms that force single 
parents to actively seek employment or lose their benefits once their child reaches the age of five 
(to be reduced to the age of three in 2017), childrearing is presented as an excuse to not work. 
As working mother Cheryl commented, after meeting unemployed father of four Luther in We All 
Pay Your Benefits, ‘I don’t think that wanting to stay at home [to look after children] is a good 
enough reason to not work’. The ‘casualties’ of neoliberalism deserve no sympathy. They deserve 
punishment.
Although the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in these programmes was not explicitly 
racially constructed, they were not without sharp racialised and xenophobic components. 
Refugees, whilst a ‘hyper-precarious’ group experiencing serious physical, material and psycho-
logical hurt (Waite et al., 2014), were constructed as threats, physically, economically, psycho-
logically and spatially. As Dorling notes (2014: 144), more broadly ‘migrants’ have been 
deliberately labelled as ‘… the source of the problem in housing, employment … education [and] 
health in countries where the rich increasingly monopolise living space, salaries, schools and 
health spending’. In 2014, in a follow up to We All Pay Your Benefits, BBC1 aired Nick and 
Margaret: Too Many Immigrants? The programme required a group of ‘British-born’ anti-immi-
gration participants to spend time with (legal, we are specifically informed) immigrants working 
in the UK. At the end of the show the ‘British-borns’ decide if immigration is, in the words of 
presenter Nick Hewer ‘a gain on the country, or simply a drain’. Despite claims that it attempted 
to challenge those with anti-immigration views, like its many predecessors the show served to 
reduce an extremely complex subject to the most simplistic dichotomy.
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Derision of the unrespectable, unredeemable and 
shameless poor: From voyeuristic altruism to voyeuristic 
hate
Confirming that the televisual spectacle of poverty was far from exhausted, in 2013 a new rhetori-
cal device was exercised by Channel 5 with its … and Proud series of programmes. Beginning with 
On Benefits and Proud, the ideological message was that claiming benefits was something of 
which one should be ashamed (as the claimant) or suspicious (as the ‘hardworking taxpayer’) – 
something more akin to theft than an entitlement. This was especially evident when the pro-
gramme was seen in the context of the other episodes in the series which featured a range of 
criminal and anti-social activity (Shoplifters and Proud (2013), Pickpockets and Proud (2013), 
Football Hooligans and Proud (2014), Dangerous Dog Owners and Proud (2014) and ASBO and 
Proud (2014)). The use of shame and humiliation for entertainment is well established within vari-
ous television genres. As Presdee (2000) demonstrates, from talk shows to game shows, the ritu-
alised shaming of (often vulnerable) people has been a well-used programme trope for several 
decades. In terms of the more recent ‘poverty shaming’ genre, the greatest vitriol has been saved 
for those who, regardless of their privations, remained unembarrassed, unapologetic or seemingly 
content with their lot. This rage against the defiance of the ‘shameless’ was nothing new. To 
quote Adorno:
[a] pattern that has been confirmed throughout the entire history of persecutions is that the 
fury against the weak chooses as its target especially those who are perceived as societally 
weak and at the same time – either rightly or wrongly – as happy. (1967: 2)
Being shameful has increasingly become a condition for (public and political) empathy and sup-
port. Shame acknowledges the poor person’s failings and lays open their inadequacies. It may not 
quite involve begging but it is about asking for help humbly and being suitably grateful. The poor 
are not to claim welfare in a spirit of citizenship and entitlement but, rather, as supplicants. For Jo 
(2013), shame may decrease the empathy gap between shamed and shamer. Whilst this relation-
ship between shame and poverty is clearly disempowering for the shamed, Jo argues that it can 
allow the non-poor to develop an understanding around some of the complex difficulties the poor 
face, so reducing negative judgement. However, programmes like those in the … and Proud series 
represent a vicious manipulation of this relationship. Relying on the converse implication – that 
where poverty is represented as shameless, or even as defiant or proud, empathy will be dimin-
ished – these programmes provide selected (unrepresentative) poor people platforms through 
which they (are prompted to) condemn themselves through their psychosocial shamelessness. 
Whether they are simply resistant to being shamed, or ‘empowering’ themselves by claiming enti-
tlements without guilt, they are, it is contended, proud.
On Benefits and Proud introduced unemployed mother Heather Frost. The focus was the num-
ber of children she had (11) and the amount of public money spent on keeping them accommo-
dated. The constant reminders that Heather had 11 children carried a clear message – that this was 
something of which the audience would disapprove and something of which Heather should be 
ashamed. Yet careful editing ensured that Heather appeared, not ashamed, but ‘proud’ (or at least, 
unashamed). Clips of Heather shrugging or looking dismissive were coupled with a voiceover 
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informing the audience she was unconcerned about the public money spent on combining two 
council houses in order to accommodate her family. After the show was aired, Heather was sub-
jected to a barrage of abuse and threats from members of the public. Despite Heather looking after 
11 children, and another of the show’s participants Julie having six children, the narrator trilled 
‘their only graft is working the system’, cueing shots of Julie and partner Vinny watching their satel-
lite TV packages, clearly with the aim of causing public resentment that ‘people on benefits in this 
country [we]re not in fact entertaining themselves with shadow puppets’ (New Statesman, 2013). 
Later, when they received their benefit payment, the narrator informed us that ‘with unexpected 
money in the bank, it [was] time to spend’. What we actually observed however was Julie and 
Vinny at the local shop paying for electricity, gas and one can of beer.
Gypsies on Benefits and Proud (2014) escalated the hatred stakes by playing on the (by now 
familiar) resentments towards immigrant groups. In one episode, we met 25 year old Viorel Dinu, 
a Romanian immigrant who had lost both legs in a rail accident when he was a child and now 
moved around on a skateboard. The narrator informed the audience that ‘[b]ack home Viorel had 
to beg to get by so life here is a relative luxury thanks to 750 quid a month in job seekers and 
disability living allowances, ten times what he would get in Romania’. One week after the show 
aired Viorel was attacked by a former soldier, angry at his appearance on the show. The attacker’s 
defence lawyer stated in court that his client ‘was annoyed that this man was claiming benefits 
when he should not have been’ (Northern Echo, 2014). The Echo recounted ‘A legless Gypsy 
busker who bragged on National TV about “milking the benefits system” had to face the music 
when confronted by an irate viewer’ (emphasis added). Meanwhile the Daily Mail (2014) reported 
‘Ex-soldier attacked amputee gypsy [sic] busker who bragged on TV about milking Britain’s benefit 
system after he recognised him in the street’. Yet at no point in the programme did Viorel ‘brag’ 
or say he was ‘milking the system’. On the contrary his attitude was one of gratitude and he (and 
other Gypsies featured) talked about how grateful they were for their opportunities in the UK. 
That Viorel ‘faced the music’ – itself a telling euphemism for straightforward assault – is implicitly 
condoned by straightforward media lies.
Conclusion
At this juncture it is appropriate to return to the question of why these programmes should be of 
concern to criminologists. There currently exists a small, but important, body of criminological 
literature, from the UK and abroad, concerned with the interplay between reality TV, crime, law, 
criminal justice and neoliberal models of governance, control and punishment. For example, in his 
analysis of Border Security: Australia’s Front Line, Walsh (2015: 202) argues that by exploiting 
‘neoliberal globalization’s dislocating features and their attendant consequences’ the programme 
serves to align public anxieties with notions of ‘security risks’ and ‘external threats’ (emphasis 
added). Through the association of particular groups, such as illegal immigrants, with risk and 
danger, and the representation of state agents as ‘heroic’ protectors, state agendas are effectively 
legitimised. For Kohm (2009), reality TV can constitute part of broader social control and criminal 
justice apparatus at a real as well as an ideological level. Using the example of NBC’s Dateline: To 
Catch A Predator (a programme in which journalists, local police and an internet watchdog group 
use hidden cameras to lure, trap, confront and in many cases arrest suspected paedophiles), he 
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contends that the message is two-fold: first, that ‘communities are under attack and the only way 
to fight back is to be perpetually on the lookout for crime’ and second, that the mass media can 
be seen as a ‘private sector solution to the “law and order” crisis’ (Kohm, 2009: 194).14
But, as critical criminologists our concerns must stretch beyond legal definitions of ‘crime’, the 
remit of criminal justice and concepts of official ‘law and order’. As we have demonstrated in this 
article, there currently exists an extensive range of programmes that demonise not just serious 
criminal offenders but those who are poor and, consequently, vulnerable. Presented as social 
pariahs who threaten social values, if not safety, these are the people that perhaps would once 
have been considered ‘at risk’ rather than ‘risky’. Importantly, these objectified representations of 
the poor, the unemployed, immigrants and other marginalised groups found in this genre of ‘real-
ity TV’ have real, serious and harmful consequences. Despite the unqualified and unsubstantiated 
claims made in many of the programmes, they have been seized upon by politicians as evidence, 
and thus as a means of bolstering the rhetoric of ‘broken Britain’. The (heavily mediated) depic-
tions of a small number of individuals and communities became the means for politicians to con-
nect with the electorate by plugging into a (misdirected) sense of outrage in order to legitimise 
the implementation of harmful austerity policies.
In the House of Commons, Conservative backbencher Simon Hart bemoaned that there was a 
Benefits Street ‘in every constituency in the land’ (BBC, 2014), whilst for Conservative MP for 
Shipley Philip Davies the programmes clearly demonstrated that benefits were too generous 
(Telegraph and Argus, 2014). Davies argued that after watching On Benefits and Proud he was 
struck by ‘the number of people … who manage to combine complaining about welfare reform 
with being able to afford to buy copious amounts of cigarettes, have lots of tattoos, and watch Sky 
TV on the obligatory widescreen TV’. His outrage was compounded because of the ‘concerns and 
irritations of many people who go to work every day and pay their taxes but cannot afford those 
kinds of luxuries’ (Telegraph and Argus, 2014). For Davies, one street resident in particular epito-
mised all that was wrong with ‘benefits Britain’. Deidre Kelly (aka ‘White Dee’), despite being 
assessed by the state as eligible for disability benefits and being credited by neighbours as a caring 
and community spirited woman, was described by Davies as ‘bone idle’ and someone who ‘doesn’t 
want to work another day in her life and has no intention of finding a job’ (Daily Star, 2014).
Referring to Benefits Street and accepting without question the programme’s depiction of 
welfare claimants, Iain Duncan Smith joined in the fray, remarking that ‘many people are shocked 
by what they see … That is why the public back our welfare reform package, which will get more 
people back to work and end these abuses’ (Daily Mirror, 2014, emphasis added). Benefits Street, 
according to Smith, revealed the existence of ‘welfare ghettos’, a ‘twilight world’ of entire com-
munities happily reliant on welfare support (Dominiczac, 2014). Even the Prime Minister David 
Cameron stressed the importance of the ‘Benefits Street message’ which was ‘to help people out 
of … poverty and benefit dependency’ (ITV, 2015, emphasis added).
The combination of these mediated representations and the powerful, yet largely unsubstan-
tiated, political rhetoric around welfare dependency and welfare abuse ensured that complex, 
but hardly incomprehensible, issues became reduced to simplistic, individualised and ireful dis-
courses in which the real problem of poverty was explained as the burden it placed on the better 
off.15 This was not redressed by the subsequent Big Benefits Row and Benefits Britain: The Live 
Debate programmes (aired in 2014 by Channel 5 and Channel 4 respectively and later followed 
by The Big Can’t Pay Debate, The Big Fat Row Debate and The Big British Immigration Row, all 
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on Channel 5).16,17 The Big Benefits Row was, according to Channel 5, to be led by a panel of 
‘experts’; yet, like the other similar ‘debate’ programmes, this consisted of politicians, journalists 
and a host of ‘TV personalities’ or ‘celebrities’. There were no ‘expert’ economists or social scien-
tists. Instead, ‘debate’ was replaced by ‘journalistic commentary and opinion polls – whose pri-
mary function [was] to comment on representations as if they were real’ (Jensen, 2014). Owen 
Jones (2014) has referred to this format as the ‘Hopkinisation’ of political discourse, whereby 
‘the mantra of mainstream politicians and journalists about people at the bottom of society [is 
repeated] but with even fewer facts and more venom’.18
In a context where anti-intellectualism in both popular culture and politics is extoled, where 
‘common sense’ is fetishised and informed debate is replaced by facile entertainment and specta-
cle, ignorance prevails. For Giroux (2014: 47), this means the ‘rendering of all social problems as 
biographical in nature’ creating a ‘reactionary public pedagogy’ and the worst kind of ‘public’ poli-
tics. Ignorance is created – but it is an ignorance which leaves the public feeling as if they are 
informed. As Chomsky et al. (1998: 43) put it: ‘The smart way to keep people passive and obedient 
is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spec-
trum …’.
Not surprisingly, public attitudes are hardening. Research carried out by NatCen examined 
changing public attitudes to poverty and welfare. They found that the relationship between eco-
nomic circumstances and attitudes to welfare had shifted over the last three decades, with the 
public increasingly more likely to blame individual characteristics rather than societal issues as the 
cause of poverty (Rae, 2013).
Of course this shift cannot be solely blamed on reality TV depictions. Nor can it be claimed that 
there is complete public acceptance of and support for the ideologies they espouse. Indeed, as 
Tyler (2014) notes, Benefits Street ‘emerged as the site of dense and fractious struggle, amongst 
the residents of James Tuner Street, television producers, television viewers, politicians, newspa-
per journalists, television pundits, anti-poverty groups, policy-makers and sociologists’ (see also 
Jensen, 2013; Skeggs and Wood, 2012; Tyler, 2013). But when coupled with a strident anti-poor 
political discourse (from across the political parties), disseminated through misleading tabloid 
reportage, it is not difficult to see how such ideas, or rather ignorance, gains currency. Coldness 
and indifference proliferate whilst empathy diminishes, especially with those most socially margin-
alised and excluded. As Giroux (2014: 9) has noted, what we are witnessing is ‘… a near socio-
pathic lack of interest in – or compassion and responsibility for – others’. The poor and weak are 
openly ridiculed and derided in the name of entertainment, blamed for mass economic harms that 
were not of their making and directly harmed by public and political responses. Therein lies the 
crucial matter at stake for criminologists.
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Notes
 1. See Peck (2010) for a discussion of Oprah Winfrey in relation to the neoliberal political-economic project.
 2. These consist of the following, with the individual number of episodes in brackets: 7 Days on the Bread-
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line (3); Duchess on the Estate (2); Gordon Behind Bars (4); Football Behind Bars (6); Nick and Margaret: 
We All Pay Your Benefits (1); Nick and Margaret: Too Many Immigrants? (1); Benefits Street Series 1 (5); 
Trouble on the Estate (1); Benefit Busters (3); On Benefits and Proud (1); Gypsies on Benefits and Proud 
(1).
 3. These consist of: Jamie Oliver’s Food Revolution; Home Is Where the Heart Is; The Alan Titchmarsh Show; 
GMTV; Saints and Scroungers; Britain on the Fiddle.
 4. Viewing figures are not routinely available without a significant subscription to the Broadcast Audience 
Research Board and thus cannot be provided for every programme referred to in this article. However, 
other sources can give an indication of audience numbers and these are provided where possible. 7 
Days on the Breadline achieved viewing figures of 3.7 million (Guardian, 2009) and Gordon Behind Bars 
reached 3 million (Radio Times, 2012), thus indicating the popularity of these shows.
 5. There is little if any historical research into the significance of British tea and biscuits in the failure of 
German aerial bombing during the Second World War. Nor is there research into whether German 
shortages of tea and biscuits contributed to the ‘success’ of Allied mass bombing of civilians in the latter 
part of the war.
 6. Note that in this quote Mills was referring to the operation of the mass media in general but we feel his 
comments are particularly pertinent to the reality TV genre. Further, his use of the term ‘frenzies’ more 
aptly describes a sense of excitement or agitation created by these early programmes, as opposed to 
wider fears (as connoted by the concept of moral panic) which were perhaps more readily exploited by 
later shows.
 7. This phase includes: Saints and Scroungers (BBC, 2009); Benefit Busters (Channel 4, 2009); The Scheme 
(BBC Scotland, 2010); Trouble on the Estate (BBC, 2012); Benefits Britain 1949 (Channel 4, 2013); Nick 
and Margaret: We All Pay Your Benefits (BBC, 2013); People Like Us (BBC, 2013); Skint (Channel 4, 
2014); Benefits Street (Channel 4, 2014); Benefits Britain: Life on the Dole (Channel 5, 2015); Benefits 
and Bypasses (Channel 5, 2015).
 8. The exceptions here are the BBC show Saints and Scroungers (2009 onwards, which features well-
known presenters Dominic Littlewood and, later, Matthew Allwright) and the BBC programmes featur-
ing Nick Hewer and Margaret Mountford (e.g. Nick and Margaret: We All Pay Your Benefits and Nick 
and Margaret: Too Many Immigrants?).
 9. According to The Guardian (2014), Benefits Street attracted 4.3 million viewers, the highest ratings for 
any Channel 4 programme in 2013 (representing a 17.2% audience share).
10. The myth of intergenerational worklessness has been exposed by Shildrick et al. (2012) who state that 
the proportion of workless households with two generations who have never worked constitutes only 
0.5% of all workless households. They found no evidence of three generations of worklessness.
11. In 2010 Saints and Scroungers pulled in 4.3 million viewers, representing the highest ratings (22.6% 
audience share) for its pre-primetime slot of 7.30pm to 8pm (Mediatel, 2010).
12. Nonetheless, the problem has clearly roused public concern. The benefits fraud hotline (emotively titled 
‘Targeting Benefit Thieves’) receives on average 600 calls per day (Guardian, 2014). The tax fraud hotline 
(which has the more sober title of ‘Report Tax Evasion’) is also actively used by the public, although not 
to the same degree, receiving around 300 calls per day mostly to report tradespeople taking cash in 
hand payments for small jobs, and has not led to any real increase in tax revenues (Telegraph, 2013).
13. In this programme (which was termed ‘an ambitious experiment’ by the BBC), TV celebrities Nick Hewer 
and Margaret Mountford aim ‘to discover how much benefit is enough to live on and if work is worth 
it’ because ‘the country is more divided than ever about how much of our taxes should be spent on 
benefits for the unemployed’ (BBC, 2013). This programme scored the highest ratings, outside of serial 
dramas (soaps) on 11 July 2013, with 4.55 million viewers or a 22.9% audience share (Digital Spy, 
2013).
14. Kohm also refers to programmes such as America’s Most Wanted and Crimewatch UK as similar exam-
ples within this genre.
15. Through this discourse those in poverty are reconstructed as the blameworthy group, indeed the cause 
of their own, and others’, privations. This is at a time when the government’s own statistics have indi-
cated that 2380 people died between December 2011 and February 2014 after being declared ‘fit for 
work’ and thus having their sickness and disability benefit claims rejected (Ryan, 2015). It is not known 
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how all of these people died but it is interesting that the DWP issued written guidance on suicide and 
self-harm threats from clients for those staff tasked with informing people their claims had been rejected 
(Domokos, 2011).
16. In The Big Can’t Pay Debate, the extent of household debt in Britain was to be discussed in order to 
determine if this was the fault of banks and financial institutions or the individuals that ‘get themselves 
into debt’.
17. The use of the term ‘row’ rather than ‘debate’ clearly indicates the type and level of discussion intended. 
This programme netted 2.13 million viewers (Televisual, 2014)
18. By ‘Hopkinisation’, Jones is referring to right wing TV personality and newspaper columnist Katie Hop-
kins. Hopkins was condemned by many in 2015 when she referred to migrants as ‘cockroaches’ in her 
Sun newspaper column.
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